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Abstract
Despite growing applications of social and healthcare marketing to enhance public well-being through anti-stigma campaigns,
little research investigates how public stigma surrounding health conditions might limit the outcomes of these campaigns. By
drawing on the theory of implicit worldviews, this study identifies reasons for public stigma as well as associated message frames
to address these reasons. Study 1a provides evidence that implicit worldviews are relevant to campaign results. Study 1b and
Study 2 demonstrate that fitting consumers’ implicit worldview with suitable (i.e., biomedical or biopsychosocial) health frames
reduces stigma endorsement. Study 3 identifies the perceived severity of a mental illness as a boundary condition; marketing
communications have the greatest impact when they refer to an illness with lower perceived severity. Finally, Study 4 expands
understanding of the phenomenon by extending the findings to physical health conditions (i.e., obesity). The article concludes by
discussing the implications of these findings for policy and future applications.
Keywords Social marketing . Mental illness . Stigma . Healthcare marketing . Message framing . Implicit worldviews .
Biomedical model . Biopsychosocial model
Marketers can develop solutions to challenging societal problems
(Andreasen et al. 2005; Lee and Kotler 2011), including well-
being. For example, social marketing campaigns can target
attitudes and behaviors related to schizophrenia, depression, sui-
cide, smoking, alcohol abuse, and obesity (Kotler 2011). Most
prior efforts have focused on individual behavioral changes, such
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as encouraging a personwith obesity to adopt healthier behaviors
(e.g., healthier eating, smoking cessation; Zhao and Pechmann
2007) or calling for widespread preventative behaviors (e.g.,
cancer screenings, condom use; Freimuth et al. 1990;
Schoenbachler et al. 1996). Although targeting communication
efforts at (potentially) affected individuals can have some effect,
it may be insufficient to achieve desired changes at a societal
level, because more general stigmatizing attitudes often impede
the effects of individual-level campaigns (Puhl and Heuer 2010).
This sort of public stigma refers to “prejudice and discrimi-
nation endorsed by the general population that affects a person”
(Corrigan et al. 2012, p. 963), expressed as part of an effort to
gain social distance “as a behavioral response” from the stig-
matized person (Corrigan et al. 2001, p. 953). Public stigma is
widespread. Moses (2010) shows that 62% of adolescents with
mental illness experience stigmatization from peers, and 46%
had similar stigmatizing experiences with family members.
Similarly, 65% of obese children experience stigma in school,
and 54% of obese workers report discrimination at work (WHO
2017b). The negative effects of such public stigma include
treatment delays or refusal, greater symptom severity, and sui-
cide risks due to isolation (Yanos et al. 2010). Furthermore, the
global estimated economic cost of untreatedmental illnesses for
2011–2030 will reach US$16.3 trillion (WHO 2013, 2017a).
Public stigma surrounding health conditions thus remains a
major impediment to both the effectiveness of interventions
(by reducing individual treatment adoption) and realizing
long-term societal benefits (by creating greater health dispar-
ities) (Booth 2017; Puhl and Heuer 2010; WHO 2017a),
highlighting the imperative to diminish public stigma.
Reducing public stigma related to mental illnesses is more
challenging than similar efforts in relation to physical ailments,
because the general public has limited knowledge about mental
illnesses (Crisp et al. 2005). As evidence of this general phenom-
enon, we list 21 prominent, large-scale, global, anti-stigma social
media campaigns in Table 1. They reached almost 3 million
followers on social networks, span 14 different countries on 3
continents, and have been in place for a decade or more. Yet
empirical evidence suggests they have short-lived, weak effects,
if any (Arboleda-Flórez 2017; Corrigan 2012). For example, the
U.K.-based #TimeToChange campaign (Evans-Lacko et al.
2013) failed to achieve its objective of consistently lowering
public stigma endorsements, despite its vast reach. Therefore,
we seek to develop a theoretically informed approach to the
design and deployment of campaigns that tackle public health
stigma, bymatching the right message with the right recipient, as
well as shed light on why many public-level campaigns fail.
Despite the critical impacts of public stigma (WHO2017a),
surprisingly little research in the social marketing field focuses
on it, or on mental health issues in general. Existing studies
that address individual behaviors often provide recommenda-
tions that explicitly seek to leverage the personal stigma asso-
ciated with an undesirable behavior, such as smoking or poor
diet, and prevent its normalization in wider society (Lin and
McFerran 2016). These strategies achieve questionable suc-
cess; they even can evoke adverse reactance and increase the
undesirable behavior (Friedman and Puhl 2012). By focusing
solely on individual behavioral changes, such research also
ignores the potential outcomes of inducing societal-level
changes, such as shifts in collective attitudes toward mental
illness or obesity (Puhl and Heuer 2010). Some evidence sug-
gests though that individual-level interventions, such as
weight management campaigns, can achieve better outcomes
if they are accompanied by large-scale campaigns to reduce
public stigma related to the condition (Hanisch et al. 2016).
Therefore, we draw on theories of implicit worldviews, that is,
the perceptions that people hold about themselves and others that
determinewhether they perceive their environment as categorical
or dimensional (Chiu et al. 1997). These viewpoints inform atti-
tude formation and decision making, especially in relation to
stereotypes and stigmatizing attitudes, and affect how people
process new information (Lyndon et al. 2016; Plaks et al.
2005). Through this substantive theoretical lens, we examine
some causes of public stigma and some previously unexamined
effects that might inform stigma reduction strategies.
Noting the persistent debate in social marketing about which
message frames are most effective for reducing stigma (Kvaale
et al. 2013), we integrate message frame theory and argue that
different frames differentially affect the levels of stigma
expressed by dimensional versus categorical thinkers.
Specifically, we note two perspectives on the etiology of illness,
dominant in healthcare and education settings: biomedical and
biopsychosocial (Jaini and Lee 2015; Kiesler 1999). By inte-
grating worldviews with health frames, we test whether the
heterogeneous stigma reduction of social marketing campaigns
reflects a (mis)match between the health message frame and the
receiver’s implicit worldview. If implicit worldviews affect peo-
ple’s reception of a campaign, anti-stigma communication de-
signs should incorporate this factor to achieve stronger results.
With this empirical examination of determinants of effective
communication strategies to reduce public stigma, we offer four
key contributions. First, we help explain the mixed results of
anti-stigma campaigns; they might stem from the failure to
acknowledge distinct implicit worldviews. By applying implicit
worldviews to mental illness, we identify an important individ-
ual difference that can predict stigma (Study 1) and explain
people’s resistance to campaigns. Second, we identify a new,
effective strategy for overcoming negative attitudes among cat-
egorical thinkers, rather than priming them with a dimensional
worldview. When specific message frames (biomedical vs.
biopsychosocial) fit the recipient’s worldview (categorical vs.
dimensional), they are more effective for reducing stigma
(Study 2), particularly for illnesses perceived to be low in se-
verity (Study 3 and 4). To the best of our knowledge, this study
is the first to explore the ways in which message frames might
reduce stigma endorsement among dimensional thinkers, as
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well as the first to test the comparative effectiveness of biomed-
ical and biopsychosocial frames directly. Third, we identify
perceived illness severity as an important boundary condition:
Our results hold for mental illnesses perceived as less severe but
not those perceived as severe (Study 3). We corroborate our
findings in a relevant physical illness context (i.e., obesity;
Study 4). Fourth, we contribute to social marketing literature
by expanding the focus to considerations of public stigma in
contrast with prevalent health communication campaigns that
solely target people affected by the condition. We thus offer
guidance for practitioners and open a promising avenue for
social marketing research.
In the next section, we locate our contributions within the
relevant theoretical context, pertaining to the relationship be-
tween public stigma and implicit worldviews. We then iden-
tify relevant mental illness message frames and assess their
usage, as well as their immediate responses, through a prelim-
inary field study. We then consider the potential fit between
implicit worldviews and mental illness message frames and
hypothesize how it might reduce public stigma through social
marketing communications that manifest this fit. We present
the empirical results of our four studies, a meta-analysis of the
results of our various studies, and then conclude by discussing
the theoretical, public policy, and managerial implications that
emerge from our research.
Theoretical development
Persuasive health communication messages have received
considerable attention in commercial and social research do-
mains (Keller and Lehmann 2008; Rüsch and Xu 2017), as we
summarize in Table 2. Such messages tend to be more suc-
cessful when their frames match recipients’ characteristics,
such as a self-regulatory orientation (Daryanto et al. 2010).
Similarly, we predict that when a message matches recipients’
worldview, it “feels right” and induces stronger effects, where-
as a mismatch likely attenuates these effects (Adnsager et al.
2001; Motyka et al. 2014; Zhao and Pechmann 2007). We
know of no prior research that highlights these individual
differences when investigating tactics to reduce public stigma,
despite their likely influences on stigma formation (Rüsch and
Xu 2017; Szeto and Dobson 2010).
Implicit worldviews as antecedents of public stigma
Implicit theories are central to a person’s way of understanding
the world (Rattan and Georgeac 2017), such that they prompt
people to view individual traits as either categorical or dimen-
sional (Chiu et al. 1997). People who see traits as categorical
display black-and-white thinking; for example, they believe in-
telligence is a fixed trait, determined at birth. Categorical
thinkers also expect consistency and predictability from a static
environment. People who see traits as dimensional instead con-
sider a multitude of variables and display more fine-grained,
shades-of-gray thinking; they view intelligence as something
to be developed over time (Chiu et al. 1997; Hong et al.
1995). With their dynamic view of the world, these dimensional
thinkers accept inconsistencies and change (Lyndon et al. 2016;
Plaks et al. 2001). Such implicit worldviews in turn affect peo-
ple’s judgments, motivation (Jain et al. 2009), affect regulation
(Labroo and Mukhopadhyay 2009), and education (Ambrose
2017); they also extend beyond personality traits to affect
health-related beliefs (Wang et al. 2009).
Noting that stereotype formation is a crucial antecedent of
stigma development, Levy et al. (1998) find that categorical
thinkers tend tomakemore extreme trait-based judgments of a
target based on limited information, due to their static think-
ing. This mechanism affects the perceptions of not just indi-
viduals but entire groups, leading to stereotype development
and ultimately public stigma (Byrne 2000). Even if categorical
and dynamic thinkers are equally aware of the stereotypes, the
former endorse both positive and negative stereotypes at
higher levels, prototypical of their worldview. These findings
hold across different settings and contexts, including racial
stereotypes and views of religious or ideological groups
(Levy et al. 1998; Plaks et al. 2001).
Implicit worldviews also influence responses to social mar-
keting campaigns. According to Plaks et al. (2005), it is ex-
tremely difficult to convince categorical thinkers to let go of
their stereotypes, because they anticipate the stability of traits
and human personality and struggle to engage in more fine-
grained thinking (Hong et al. 1995). Therefore, implicit
worldviews likely define how stigmatizing attitudes form
(Rüsch et al. 2010), and categorical thinkers tend to adopt
stronger stigmatizing attitudes. For example, they likely reject
or ignore information about advanced treatments and im-
proved prognoses, because their confirmation bias leads them
to process only information that is consistent with their al-
ready held beliefs (e.g., “people with mental illness are bad
and can’t change,” Lyndon et al. 2016).
Next to the well-known and often replicated finding that
familiarity with mental illness or mentally ill people lowers
public stigma on an individual level (e.g. Corrigan 2004,
2012; Corrigan et al. 2012 and Schomerus et al. 2007), limited
research considers relevant personality traits as potential mod-
erators in anti-stigma campaigns though, despite some evi-
dence of their effects (Sampogna et al. 2017). Public stigma,
as we define it, implies discriminatory attitudes among a gen-
eral population toward a certain group of individuals, which
lead to increased distance. Seeking such social distance im-
plies behavioral intentions to avoid or discriminate against
mentally ill people (Corrigan 2004). Social distance is an ul-
timate public stigma state, and its implications for behavioral
intentions make it particularly relevant, because mentally ill
people suffer acutely when a public stigma against them is
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openlymanifested (Corrigan 2004). Furthermore, though pub-
lic stigma pertain to groups, social distance attitudes relate to
individual members of those groups. By considering person-
ality difference, we thus leverage an individual-level perspec-
tive on public stigma against mental illness.
On this individual level, we predict that the confirmation
bias displayed by categorical thinkers leaves themmore likely
to ignore counter-stigma information that challenges their
worldview, which prioritizes consistency and predictability
(Lyndon et al. 2016; Plaks et al. 2001). That is, categorical
thinkers view the world in fixed states (Lyndon et al. 2016)
and judge categories rigidly (i.e., something is either entirely
“good” or entirely “bad,”without any middle ground), so they
continue to demonstrate their sense of stigma in response to
anti-stigma campaigns. In contrast, dimensional thinkers take
a more dynamic view, do not simply regard anyone with men-
tal illness as “bad,” and accept inconsistency (Jain et al. 2009),
so they may display less stigma endorsement, and the anti-
stigma campaign messages align with and reinforce this
worldview. We hypothesize:
H1:Categorical thinkers exhibit more public stigma, measured
by social distance, than dimensional thinkers after both
groups have been exposed to counter-stigmatic
information.
Health message framing
Prior efforts to frame health communication messages to reduce
public stigma yield mixed results (Arboleda-Flórez 2017;
Corrigan 2012; Keller and Lehmann 2008), possibly due to
the unintended consequences that arise depending on the repre-
sentation of the etiology of the illness (i.e., causes). Two main
health frames exist for the conceptualization of disease and as-
sociated health communication activities: the biomedical and
biopsychosocial models. Both frames have the potential to re-
duce stigma about the responsibility of people diagnosed with
mental illnesses but also may inadvertently increase stigma re-
lated to treatments and prognoses (Kvaale et al. 2013).
A biomedical message frame focuses on physiological or-
igins and describes an illness as universal, across cultures and
times. This frame could combat public stigma that arises due
to a lack of knowledge or understanding of the condition, by
emphasizing a single, clear-cut cause (Corrigan 2004), and it
could reduce attributions of blame toward people with these
conditions. The biomedical model does not view illness as a
moral shortcoming or a reflection on the person’s traits and
abilities, such as self-control (Lincoln et al. 2008). Yet the
simplicity of this biomedical perspective also could prompt a
categorization of people diagnosed with mental illnesses into
broad disease states, which can lead to stigma; being tagged
with the illness might be perceived negatively (Rüsch et al.
2010).
Instead, the biopsychosocial message frame represents ill-
ness as fuzzy, with multiple potential causes, marked by
boundaries and interlinkages (e.g., co-morbidities with other
mental or physical ailments). In this view, conditions such as
mental illness result from individual circumstances that vary
across cultures and time and are often situational in nature
(Haslam et al. 2002). Biopsychosocial messages highlight
the individual experience of the patient and illness, with a
focus on psychological and social causes, not just biological
determinants (Ghaemi 2009), which could have stigma-
reducing effects. Such messaging shifts the receiver’s focus
from a generic stereotype of people with the condition to a
more detailed understanding of individual cases and causes,
which may prevent generalizations and reduce stigma forma-
tion (Read et al. 2006). Yet emphasizing the complex etiology
of conditions may create an overly vague view among mes-
sage recipients (e.g., too many determinants) or hinder their
understanding due to message complexity, which then could
lead to greater public stigma (Ghaemi 2009).
Exploratory study of secondary data Both types of messages
have unique strengths and weaknesses (Ghaemi 2009; Rüsch
et al. 2010). They also are both prevalent in practice. We
examined 259 posts by the U.K.-based #TimeToChange cam-
paign (largest public stigma reduction campaign conducted
via social media) for a 52-week period (January 1–
December 31, 2018), along with their engagement metrics
(number of likes, comments, and shares).1
A key objective of this exploratory study was to understand
how prevalent these two types of messages, and how they
influence reader engagement. Using a codebook designed in
conjunction with an expert health psychologist (non-author),
two independent coders, who were authors, then classified the
posts. We found that these posts consistently used both bio-
medical (51) and biopsychosocial (194) health message
frames. In three ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions,
we further found that biomedical (relative to biopsychosocial)
messages result in greater likes, shares, and comments, as well
as enhanced engagement.2 The results in Table 3 indicate that
1 Two coders categorized posts (82% agreement) as biomedical,
biopsychosocial, or non–health framed messages. The 14 messages (5.4%)
identified as non–health framed were dropped from the analysis, yielding
245 posts in the final sample.
2 Customer engagement is a viral, exponential phenomenon (Berger 2011), so
we used a natural log transformation of the dependent variables. In addition,
the data span the course of a year, so we controlled for trends that might be due
to seasonality fluctuations or changes to the algorithm. We also controlled for
different content and post types (links, photos, videos). Then we coded the
posts as stories of people affected by mental illnesses, information about men-
tal illness, event notifications (e.g., mental illness awareness week), or calls to
action issued to the general public. The three OLS models are significant
(F(17,227)Likes = 4.03, p < .01, adj. R
2 = .17; F(17,227)Shares = 7.72, p < .01,
adj. R2 = .32; F(17,227)Comments = 2.25, p < .01, adj. R
2 = .08). The effect of
biomedical messages is positive and significant for likes (βstandardized = .17,
p < .01, r = .179) and shares (βstandardized = .16, p < .01, r = .190) and margin-
ally significant for comments (βstandardized = .11, p < .1, r = .110).
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biomedical messages tend to evoke greater engagement than
biopsychosocial messages, yet the #TimeToChange campaign
uses more biopsychosocial stimuli. Therefore, this study
shows the relevance of both, the practical usage of the identi-
fied message frames as well as their potential impact on a
viewer’s reaction.
Implicit worldviews and health message framing
Marketing messages are more persuasive when their frame
matches the target’s personality (Daryanto et al. 2010). A
message that resembles the recipient’s own attitudes seems
more familiar, which increases the cognitive ease of process-
ing it, makes the message feel right (Higgins 2005), and
causes it to appear more convincing, by evoking positive feel-
ings and fewer doubts about its truthfulness. In contrast, a
message that violates a person’s worldview seems unfamiliar,
feels wrong, and causes more skeptical reactions and in-
creased stigma (Kahneman 2011; Plaks et al. 2005). Thus,
counter-stigmatic information presented with a health mes-
sage frame that fits recipients’ worldviews could prompt both
types of implicit theorists to process the messages distinctly. A
matching message frame can offer an actionable means to
overcome categorical thinkers’ reluctance to process anti-
stigma information; in contrast, a dimensional thinker’s
worldview would be violated by information that suggests a
person cannot change certain traits, including mental illness
(i.e., biomedical frame; Bastian and Haslam 2006), which
could lead to increased stigmatization. Either biomedical or
biopsychosocial framing thus may match (or mismatch) a per-
son’s implicit worldview.
Biomedically framed messages provide unambiguousness,
clarity, and a categorical structure (Ghaemi 2009). Categorical
thinkers view the world as static and uniform, so they should
prefer messages that emphasize compatible illness attributes,
such as (1) traits that provide clearly diagnosable signals (Chiu
et al. 1997), (2) observations that can be generalized from
individuals to groups (Levy et al. 1998), and (3) a sharp con-
trast between good and bad (Plaks et al. 2001). Accordingly,
whereas a biopsychosocially framed message is unlikely to
reduce public stigma endorsement by categorical thinkers, be-
cause it does not align with their worldview (Plaks et al.
2005), a biomedical model reflects their static, categorical
worldview and thus should work particularly well (Dweck
et al. 1995). We predict that categorical thinkers process
counter-stigmatic information better if information is framed
as a biomedical message.
For dimensional thinkers, the contextual and individual
focus of the biopsychosocial message frame is more in line
with their worldview, which encourages them to make fewer
generalizations and assigns more importance to the context
(Chiu et al. 1997). The focus on individual cases and room
for interpretation also accords closely with the nuanced
judgments that dimensional thinkers prefer (Dweck et al.
1995). In contrast, with a biomedical message frame, even if
they endorse stereotypes less overall, dimensional thinkers
may increase their stigma endorsement in response to this
violation of their worldview, particularly if it primes them to
adopt more categorical thinking (Bastian and Haslam 2006).
By depicting illnesses in isolation from the context, this frame
could foster a sense of powerlessness or inability to change
(Read et al. 2006), with the related sense that mental illness is
uncontrollable. Formally,
H2a: Categorical thinkers exhibit lower levels of public stig-
ma, measured by social distance, after being exposed to a
biomedical frame message rather than a biopsychosocial
frame message.
H2b:Dimensional thinkers exhibit higher levels of public stig-
ma, measured by social distance, after being exposed to a
biomedical frame message rather than a biopsychosocial
frame message.
The moderating role of illness severity
Stigma exists for many types of illnesses (Teachman et al.
2006), and perceived illness severity alters stigma perceptions
(Gaebel and Zäske 2006). Illnesses vary in the degree to which
they affect a person’s ability to perform normal life tasks and
thus the degree or type of stigma they invoke. Illnesses with
lower perceived severity (e.g., mild anxiety) may prompt a
sense that affected people are not really ill or should be able
to ‘pull themselves together’. More severe disorders (e.g.,
autism) are more widely accepted as illnesses, but they also
cause increased stigma, related to fears of unpredictable be-
haviors by affected persons (Gaebel and Zäske 2006).
Moreover, perceived severity varies across observers, so no-
table differences might arise in perceptions of the severity of
the same disease category. Depression might be regarded as a
temporary phenomenon that is treatable and manageable or a
severe condition with extreme potential consequences (e.g.,
suicide). In a similar sense, obesity might be perceived as a
rather mild condition, causing arthritis and digestive prob-
lems, or as a severe condition that increases cancer and stroke
risks. Therefore, we explore how illness severity perceptions,
both between diseases and within the same condition, interact
with implicit worldviews and message frames.
When an illness is perceived as less severe, people diag-
nosed with that illness often do not display significant impair-
ments in their daily life functions.3 Significant impairments
are a necessary but not sufficient criterion for diagnoses, and
3 As measured by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5 (DSM-5) World
Health Organization Disability Assessment Schedule 2.0 (WHODAS 2.0;
Gold 2014)
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conditions perceived as low in severity often generate debate
about whether they warrant a diagnosis (Coffey et al. 2011).
The debate about whether an impairment is a diagnosable
condition likely affects categorical thinkers more than dimen-
sional ones; with their black-and-white worldviews, they re-
ject loosely defined constructs (Plaks et al. 2001). Ambiguity
about whether an illness is severe may lead categorical
thinkers to exhibit more public stigma when they consider a
biopsychosocial message but not when they receive a biomed-
ical message, which gives them clear information to overcome
the initial ambiguity. Dimensional thinkers instead may be
more persuaded by nuanced, biopsychosocial messages rather
than a categorical, biomedical perspective, because it fits their
nuanced, dimensional worldview.
In contrast, if an illness is perceived as severe, the impair-
ment of daily functioning likely makes the detrimental effects
on people’s lives more visible and salient to others, negating
any diagnostic ambiguity (Coffey et al. 2011). A general con-
sensus about the abnormality of behaviors displayed by a per-
son with a severe illness could provoke persistent public stig-
ma (Socall and Holtgraves 1992), which would be hard to
change for either implicit worldview. Therefore, we expect
no significant differences across implicit theories, regardless
of the message used, when the mental illness is perceived as
severe. We hypothesize:
H3:When illness is perceived as low in severity, a biomedical
(biopsychosocial) message frame presented to categorical
(dimensional) thinkers reduces stigma endorsement in
comparison with a biopsychosocial (biomedical) mes-
sage. This effect is attenuated for illnesses perceived as
severe.
To test these hypotheses, we present four studies below. In
Study 1 we analyze the relevance of both implicit theories and
message frames using survey-based data. In Study 2 we con-
sider the interactions of message frames (biomedical or
biopsychosocial) with implicit worldviews. We then explore
the effects of perceived severity on the reception of anti-
stigmamessages in relation to implicit worldviews, using both
a between-illness comparison and a within-illness manipula-
tion (Studies 3 and 4). Overall, we present five studies to test
our hypotheses, and Table 4 provides an overview of the hy-
pothesis testing results.
Study 1: Establishing the relevance of implicit
theories and message framing
First, we establish that categorical thinkers display more stig-
ma on average, even after they have been exposed to neutral
anti-stigma campaigns (Study 1a), testing H1. Subsequently,
we follow upwith Study 1b, in which we expose consumers to
actual campaign stimuli using the identified message frames
to assess the interaction of implicit worldviews and message
frames on stigma endorsement, formally assessing H1, H2a,
and H2b.
Study 1a
Design and procedure We assessed the implicit theory of our
respondents gathered from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) and then exposed them to a purely informational
(neither biopsychosocial nor medical) anti-stigma campaign
(Appendix A) and received 217 complete questionnaires. An
attention check at the end of the study, in which we asked if
respondents had honestly evaluated all the measures, along
with a note that a negative response would not affect their
compensation, led us to delete 12 responses, for a final sample
of 205 respondents. Respondents were 33 years of age on
average and 62% of them were men. Furthermore, 49% of
respondents had an undergraduate university degree, and
98% were from the United States. We asked them to assess
their own implicit worldview (Dweck et al. 1995), prior to any
other measures.
Dependent measure After completing the implicit theory
measure and seeing the advertisement, respondents completed
a seven-item social distance scale that indicated their willing-
ness to interact with mentally ill people (Link et al. 1999;
Appendix B), an often-used measure of public stigma. The
items relied on seven-point Likert scales. We also gathered
demographic information and assessed respondents’ familiar-
ity with mental illnesses, using a seven-item measure of how
many contact points with mental illnesses a respondent had
throughout his or her life, which we summed into an index
(Schomerus et al. 2007; Appendix B).
Coding and reliability Responses to the implicit theory mea-
sure were highly reliable (Cronbach’s α = .87). We calculated
the average of the three items to measure participants’ chronic
implicit worldview; higher values represent more categorical
thinking. The stigma measure achieves good reliability
(αSocialDistance = .84) and is coded such that higher scores in-
dicate a more stigmatizing attitude toward mental illnesses.
Results and discussion With an OLS regression (adjusted
R2 = .14) that controls for familiarity with mental illness, we
examined the effect of implicit worldviews on people’s public
stigma. Categorical thinkers demonstrate more stigma than
dimensional thinkers (β = .193, SE = .077; p < .05, r = .17),
supporting H1 that current campaigns are insufficient to elim-
inate the difference in stigma between dynamic and categori-
cal thinkers. Mental illness familiarity is significant, where
lower levels of stigma arise from participants with more
J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci.
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previous experience with mental illness (β = −.280, SE = .055;
p < .01, r = .36), in line with Lyndon et al. (2016).
Study 1b
To understand both stigma endorsement and message frame
effects, we exposed participants to two exemplars of both
frames, drawn from the social media campaign of our prelim-
inary study (Appendix A). These stimuli were validated in the
preliminary study, but we also conducted a pilot test to con-
firm the appropriateness of the stimuli. We measure stigma
endorsement and worldview to identify the differential effects
of health message frames according to worldview.
Design and procedure To test the differential effects of implic-
it worldviews on anti-stigma campaigns (H1) and provide
initial field-based evidence of the importance of a message
frame (H2a and H2b), we exposed 295 U.S.-based MTurk
respondents randomly to one of four selected stimuli from
the #TimeToChange campaign, that is, two biopsychosocial
stimuli and two biomedical examples (Appendix A) after hav-
ing assessed their implicit worldview. Respondents were
37 years of age on average, and 45% of them were men.
Moreover, 53% of respondents had an undergraduate univer-
sity degree. Similar to the preliminary Study 1a, participants
self-assessed their implicit worldview (Dweck et al. 1995),
prior to all other measures. An attention check, as in Study
1a, led us to delete 15 responses, for a final sample of 280
respondents.
Dependent measure After seeing the advertisement, respon-
dents completed the social distance measure from Study 1a
(Link et al. 1999; Appendix B) to assess their willingness to
interact with mentally ill people. We asked demographic ques-
tions and assessed familiarity with mental illnesses with the
seven-item measure (Schomerus et al. 2007; Appendix B).
Coding and reliability Responses to the implicit theory mea-
sure were highly reliable (Cronbach’s α = .91). We calculated
the average of the three items to measure participants’ chronic
implicit worldview; higher values represent more categorical
thinking. The stigma measure achieves comparable reliability
(αSocialDistance = .92) and is coded such that higher scores in-
dicate a more stigmatizing attitude toward mental illnesses.
Pretest To verify the effectiveness of the message frames for
the real-life stimuli, we conducted a pretest with 64 respon-
dents fromMTurk, using a within-subjects design. All respon-
dents saw all four message stimuli, in combined pairs, such
that they rated a biomedical and a biopsychosocial frame in
turn, using four semantic differential items (Appendix B). The
paired sample t-tests indicate significant differences for each
stimulus (MBiomed1 = 3.61, SD = 1.23; MBPS1 = 4.12, SD =
1.06, tBiomed1 – BPS1 = −3.21, p < .05, r = .20; MBiomed2 =
3.71, SD = 1.31, MBPS2 = 4.08, SD = 1.20, tBiomed2 – BPS2 =
−2.70, p < .05, r = .16).
Results and discussion With an OLS regression (adj. R2 = .13)
that controls for familiarity withmental illness, we examined the
effect of implicit worldviews on people’s mental illness stigma
after they have been exposed to either a biomedical or a
biopsychosocial message. The main effect of message design
on stigma endorsement is non-significant (β = .596, SE = .445;
p > .1, r = .100), indicating potential moderation. Categorical
thinkers demonstrate more stigma than dimensional thinkers,
as denoted by the positive coefficient (β = .318, SE = .083;
p < .01, r = .224) and in support of H1. We also observe a sig-
nificant interaction between message design (biomedical or
biopsychosocial) and implicit worldview (β = −.275,
SE = .123; p < .05, r = .141). A follow-up Johnson-Neyman
spotlight analysis using the mean of the implicit theory scale
(MIT = 3.41, SD = 1.21), reveals that for categorical thinkers (at
MIT + SD = 4.62, 19% of respondents are above it) a biomedical
frame lowers stigma endorsement, (β = −.673, SE = .210;
p < .01), while for dimensional thinkers (at MIT - SD = 2.19,
21% of respondents were below it) there is no differential effect
of the message frames (β = 0.06, SE = .210; p > .10).
In addition, results of a floodlight analysis indicate that the
stigma reducing effect of biomedical frames are effective for
respondents who score higher than 3.24 on the implicit world-
view scale. This interaction indicates that biomedically framed
messages are more effective for reducing stigma among people
with stronger categorical mindsets, in support of H2a. However,
looking at dimensional thinkers in this study, the campaignmes-
sages did not alter their stigma endorsement significantly, so we
cannot confirm H2b. Our results are reported in Fig. 1. Mental
illness familiarity has a significant influence; lower levels of
stigma arise from participants who are more familiar with men-
tal illness (β = −.171, SE = .037; p < .01, r = .265; Lyndon et al.
2016). We next extend these findings using lab-based experi-
ments to provide a stronger test of the hypotheses.
Study 2: Fitting health message frames
to implicit worldviews
We investigate the effects of fitting a message frame with
people’s implicit worldview to test H2a and H2b in a con-
trolled setting. In addition, we manipulate implicit worldviews
instead of using self-reports, to establish causality in the hy-
pothesized effects (Chiu et al. 1997).
Design and procedure
We set up a 3 (message frame: biomedical vs. biopsychosocial
vs. none) × 2 (worldview prime: categorical vs. dimensional)
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between-subjects experiment. Undergraduate students (N =
250) from a large North American university completed the
questionnaire. To ensure that they understood the materials,
we included questions to assess the participants’ comprehen-
sion of the worldview priming materials. Twenty-three partic-
ipants answered incorrectly, resulting in a final sample of 227
participants. The sample had an average age of 21 years, 55%
were men, and 98% had a high school diploma as their highest
level of completed education.
We manipulated their implicit worldviews at the beginning
of the study with a shortened version of the categorical and
dimensional worldview prime developed by Chiu et al.
(1997), which consists of two versions of an article (see
Yorkston et al. 2010). The dimensional prime stressed that
people’s characters can change over time and supported these
statements with examples and scientific evidence. The cate-
gorical version instead portrayed basic character traits as fixed
over time, citing different examples and academic studies.
According to prior studies (Levy et al. 1998; Yorkston et al.
2010), implicit worldviews are a trait-state variable, so people
can embrace either worldview, even if they tend chronically to
prefer one or the other; that is, both worldviews can be primed.
After the priming and filler questions, participants viewed
either the biomedical or the biopsychosocial message about
mental illness (Appendix C) or neither; the latter served as the
control condition. We then presented the neutral anti-stigma
campaign stimuli from Study 1a to all respondents, which
helps highlight the relevance of the biomedical and
biopsychosocial message frames, in addition to the ad mes-
sage, and subsequently measured public stigma using the so-
cial distance scale (Link et al. 1999). Respondents also noted
their personal experience with mental illness.
Results
Manipulation check The implicit worldview assessment scale,
collected at the end of the experiment, served as a successful
manipulation check (MDimens ional = 2.82, SD = .98;
MCategorical = 3.82, SD = 1.17; t(226) = −6.97, p < .001,
r = .42). We checked the manipulation of the message frame
by asking respondents whether they considered mental ill-
nesses static or dynamic and whether mental illnesses are in-
variant or diverging across cultures, as in the pretest of Study
1b. A significant one-way analysis of variance (F(2,224) =
11.01, p < .001) indicated that the definitions successfully al-
tered participants’ perceptions of mental illnesses (MBioMed =
2.84, SD = 1.10;MControl = 3.24, SD = .94;MBPS = 3.63, SD =
1.06, least-square difference post hoc comparisons p < .05,
r = . 3 0 ) . T h e d e p e n d e n t m e a s u r e i s r e l i a b l e
(αSocialDistance = .91), and again, higher values indicate more
stigmatizing attitudes toward mental illness.
Hypothesis tests To test our hypotheses, we applied an analy-
sis of covariance (ANCOVA), controlling for mental illness
familiarity. We find a significant main effect for implicit
worldview (F(1,220) = 4.34, p < .05, r = .138), which repli-
cates our Study 1 results; categorical thinkers exhibit more
stigma. The main effect of the message frame is non-
significant (F(2,220) = .76, p > .1). Mental illness experience
again reveals a significant negative effect (F(1,220) = 15.39,
p < .01, r = .255), such that stigma levels are lower when peo-
ple have more experience with mental illness. Finally, the
interaction between the message frame and worldview is sig-
nificant (F(2,220) = 6.64, p < .01, r = .239), as we depict in
Fig. 2.
Planned contrasts confirm that categorical thinkers exhibit
lower stigma when they receive a biomedical rather than a
biopsychosocial or no message frame (MCatBPS = 4.32,
SD = .94; MCatBioMed = 3.52, SD = 1.04; MCatCtrl = 4.06,
SD = 1.35; FBPS–BioMed(1220) = 10.29, p < .01; FBPS–
Control(1220) = 5.51, p < .05), in support of H2a. In line with
H2b, dimensional thinkers demonstrate marginally lower stig-
ma when exposed to a biopsychosocial rather than a biomed-
ical message frame, though we find no significant differences
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for the control group (MDimBPS = 3.48, SD = 1.07;
MDimBioMed = 3.92, SD = 1.24; MDimCtrl = 3.58, SD = 1.14;
FBPS–BioMed(1220) = 3.06, p < .1; all other p > .1). Moreover,
when exposed to a biopsychosocial or no frame, categorical
thinkers exhibit stronger stigma than dimensional thinkers
(MCatBPS = 4.32, SD = .94; MDimBPS = 3.48, SD = 1.07;
F(1,220) = 10.88, p < .01; MCatCtrl = 4.06, SD = 1.35;
MDimCtrl = 3.58, SD = 1.14; F(1,220) = 4.02, p < .05), and this
effect reverses marginally when respondents encounter a bio-
medical frame (MCatBioMed = 3.52, SD = 1.04; MDimBioMed =
3.92, SD = 1.24; F(1,120) = 2.81, p < .1).
Discussion
These results indicate that people can be primed to think ac-
cording to either worldview but also that marketers must con-
sider the fit of the health message frame with the implicit
worldview that people hold, if they want to maximize the
stigma-reducing capacities of their campaigns. In support of
H2a, a biomedical message frame significantly reduces cate-
gorical thinkers’ stigma, compared with the control group and
the biopsychosocial frame. Partially supporting H2b, a mis-
match of the message frame and worldview also fails to
reduce stigma endorsement, offering some explanation of
why anti-stigma campaigns often are ineffective (Arboleda-
Flórez 2017; Corrigan 2012; Keller and Lehmann 2008).
Study 3: Perceived severity of mental illness
as a boundary condition
We next turn our attention to a potential boundary condition,
namely, the perceived severity of mental illness (H3). When
mental illnesses are perceived as low in severity, more ambi-
guity exists (cf. severe illness) regarding whether a person can
be diagnosed with the illness, due to the relatively limited
impairments to her or his daily functioning. As we have
established already, categorical thinkers may exhibit greater
stigma in response to a biopsychosocial message but not a
biomedical message, and dimensional thinkers instead should
be more persuaded by a nuanced biopsychosocial message
than by the biomedical perspective (H2a and H2b). Here, we
also argue that when perceived illness severity is high, the
stigma differences between worldviews get attenuated.
Design and procedure
We use a 2 (message frame: biomedical vs. biopsychosocial) ×
2 (worldview prime: categorical vs. dimensional) × 2 (per-
ceived illness severity: low vs. high) between-subjects exper-
imental design. Respondents (N = 326) from MTurk complet-
ed the questionnaire, but we removed 10 participants that in-
dicated their lack of seriousness on the check that we also used
in Study 1. Another 34 respondents were excluded because
they failed the implicit worldview prime comprehension
checks from Study 2, yielding a final sample of 282 partici-
pants. The final sample had an average age of 33 years (18 to
69 years), 99% were U.S. citizens, and 56% were men.
Finally, 23% of the respondents finished high school, another
21% had completed an apprenticeship or additional training,
and 56% held a college degree. These participants were ran-
domly exposed to the categorical or dimensional worldview
primes from Study 2 (Chiu et al. 1997), then received either
the biomedical or biopsychosocial message (Appendix C).
Participants reviewed advertisements focused on either
Internet addiction (low severity) or schizophrenia (high sever-
ity; Appendix A).
Results
Pretest To select mental illness conditions for the study, we
pretested a list of eight mental illnesses with regard to their
perceived severity, using a three-item scale developed by
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Witte (1996). Internet addiction, which falls within the family
of impulse control disorders (WHO 2013), was perceived as
the least severe, statistically equal to the neutral scale midpoint
(MInt = 4.38, SD = 1.65; t(31) = 1.31, p > .1). Schizophrenia
was perceived as the most severe (MSchiz = 6.33, SD = 1.49)
and significantly more severe than Internet addiction (t(31) =
7.21, p < .01, r = .46). The mean mental illness severity across
the eight mental illnesses was significantly higher than
Internet addiction but significantly lower than schizophrenia
(MMental = 5.26, SD = 1.74, tInt–Mental(31) = 4.64, p < .01,
r = .35; tMental–Schiz = 4.59, p < .01, r = .33).
Manipulation check Similar to Study 2, we included the im-
plicit worldview assessment scale at the end of the experiment
to serve as a manipulation check. The results indicate that
worldview was successfully manipulated (MDimensional =
2.86, SD = 1.04; MCategorical = 3.74, SD = 1.19; t(280) = 6.30,
p < .001, r = .37).
Hypothesis tests In an ANCOVA in which we controlled for
mental illness experience, we find a marginally significant
three-way interaction of implicit worldview × message × ill-
ness severity (F(1, 273) = 3.37, p = .068, r = .110). All other
main and interaction effects are non-significant, except for the
control variable, such that stigma decreases with more mental
illness experience (F(1,273) = 12.01, p < .01, r = .205).
To test H3, we report planned contrasts to investigate the
worldview × message frame interaction at low or high levels of
perceived mental illness severity. The results for low perceived
severity largely replicate our findings from Study 2. In partial
support of H3, when perceived mental illness severity is low,
categorical thinkers exposed to a biomedical frame express sig-
nificantly lower stigma than those exposed to a biopsychosocial
frame (MCatBioMed = 3.75, SD = 1.29;MCatBPS = 4.39, SD = 1.12;
F(1,273) = 4.42, p < .05). Dimensional thinkers indicate equiva-
lent attitudes across message frames (MDimBioMed = 3.93, SD =
1.31; MDimBPS = 3.70, SD = 1.27; F(1,273) = .59, p > .1). When
perceived mental illness severity is high, the planned contrasts
reveal no significant differences across conditions, as we predict-
ed in H3 (MDimBPS = 3.89, SD = 1.29;MDimBioMed = 3.93, SD =
1.44; MCatBPS = 3.74, SD = 1.58; MCatBioMed = 4.00, SD = 1.18;
all p > .1; see Fig. 3).
Discussion
These results offer further, if partial, support for our prediction
that when mental illness is perceived as less severe, matching
a biomedical (biopsychosocial) message frame with categori-
cal (dynamic) theorists’ worldview lowers stigma. That is, we
confirm this prediction for categorical thinkers (H2a) but find
no significant result for dimensional thinkers (H2b)—though
the observed means trend in the expected direction.
Furthermore, our results confirm the attenuation of these
effects when perceived illness severity is high. Thus, Study
3 partially supports our previous findings and establishes per-
ceived illness severity as an important boundary condition. As
long as anti-stigma campaigns are general in their domain
(e.g., “mental illness”) or focused on low severity illnesses,
messages should match their biomedical or biopsychosocial
approaches to recipients’ implicit worldviews. If the campaign
instead focuses on a severe mental illness, the differences
between the two implicit worldviews are less relevant.
Study 4: Within-illness severity and extension
to obesity-related stigma
We seek to substantiate and generalize our previous findings by
shifting the study context to test H2a, H2b, and H3 again. Study
3 tested illness severity as a between-condition phenomenon; in
Study 4, we tackle the perceived severity of the same condition.
In addition, mental illness is not the only healthcare field in
which public stigma is a major obstacle to people seeking treat-
ment. Thus, to determine if our findings transfer to physical
health conditions, we focus on obesity in Study 4.
Design and procedure
The design of Study 4 is a 2 (message frame: biomedical vs.
biopsychosocial) × 2 (worldview prime: categorical vs. di-
mensional) × 2 (perceived illness severity: low vs. high)
between-subjects experiment. Of the 300 respondents from
MTurk who completed the study, 46 were removed due to
self-reported lack of seriousness (12) or a failed reading com-
prehension score (34). The final sample, with 254 participants,
had an average age of 34 years (18 to 71 years), 61% were
men, the majority indicated a college degree as their highest
form of education (56%), and 99% were U.S. citizens.
Participants were randomly allocated to read the categorical
or dimensional prime, as in Studies 2 and 3, then received a
biomedical or biopsychosocial message about obesity, follow-
ed by a low or high severity presentation of obesity (Appendix
C), using different symptoms that we pretested. Then partici-
pants were exposed to a neutral anti-stigma campaign focused
on obesity (Appendix A). They completed the measures of
interest, manipulation checks, and demographic items.
Results
Manipulation check As in previous studies, we tested the ma-
nipulation of worldviews, which proved successful
(MDimensional = 3.19, SD = 1.36; MCategorical = 3.83, SD = 1.43;
t(252) = −3.61, p < .001, r = .22). We also tested the message
frame manipulation, using the items from Study 2; the frame
significantly altered perceptions of the variability of causes of
obesity (MBiomed = 3.11, SD = 1.07; MBPS = 3.62, SD = 1.01,
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t(252) = −3.82, p < .001, r = .23). Finally, we tested the severity
manipulation using the items from the pretest of Study 3 and
found a significant shift in the perceived severity of obesity
(MMild = 5.17, SD = 1.16; MSevere = 5.76, SD = 1.00, t(252) =
−4.26, p < .001, r = .26).
Hypothesis tests A significant ANCOVA (F(8, 245) = 2.35,
p < .05, r = .26), controlling for obesity experience, demon-
strates a significant two-way interaction between implicit
worldview and message frame (F(1, 245) = 4.90, p < .05,
r = .141), as well as a significant three-way interaction of im-
plicit worldview × message frame × illness severity (F(1,
245) = 4.58, p < .05, r = .134). We controlled for experience
with the condition (obesity), which proves significant
(F(1,245) = 7.12, p < .01, r = .167), indicating less stigmawith
more experience with this condition. All other main and inter-
action effects are non-significant.
To confirm that H3 holds for within-illness changes
of perceived severity in a physical health context, we
analyze the worldview × message interaction separately
for low and high perceived severity. When perceived
severity is low, the results largely support our previous
findings. When categorical thinkers are exposed to the
biomedical, rather than biopsychosocial, frame, they in-
dicate significantly lower stigma (MCatBioMed = 2.31,
SD = 1.36; MCatBPS = 3.06, SD = 1.43; F(1,245) = 6.39,
p < .05, r = .159). In further support of H3, dimensional
thinkers respond with less obesity stigma to a
biopsychosoc ia l f rame than a biomedica l one
(MDimBPS = 2.41, SD = 1.05; MDimBioMed = 3.06, SD =
1.19; F(1,245) = 4.50, p < .05, r = .134). The worldview
× message interaction is non-significant in the high se-
verity condition, in support of H3 (MDimBPS = 2.72,
SD = .94; MDimBioMed = 2.61, SD = 1.19; MCatBPS = 2.74,
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Fig. 3 Implicit worldview ×
message interaction for high and
low illness severity (Study 3).
Note: Higher means imply more
stigma toward mental illnesses
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SD = 1.34; MCatBioMed = 2.60, SD = 1.10; all p > .1;
Fig. 4). When illness severity is perceived as high, cat-
egorical and dimensional thinkers exhibit equal levels of
s t i gma i n r e s pon s e t o bo t h b i omed i c a l and
biopsychosocial frames.
Discussion
This study deepens understanding of how to reduce
public stigma by confirming that matching the frame
used to describe an illness with recipients’ worldview
affects public stigma in physical disease categories, such
as obesity (H2a and H2b). We also replicate the find-
ings of a moderating role of high illness severity per-
ceptions on the interaction of worldviews and message
frames (H3). These results are a promising step toward
a new approach for public stigma campaigns.
General discussion
The burden of mental illnesses is evident at both personal and
societal levels (WHO 2013). Substantial ongoing work at the
individual level seeks effective ways to overcome the so-
called treatment gap, such that only 25%–30% of people with
mental illnesses receive treatment (WHO 2017a). Our focus is
on public mental illness stigma, which significantly impedes
both the effectiveness of individual-level campaigns and the
potential societal benefits associated with addressing mental
illnesses. Combating public stigma is a critical component of
efforts to reduce the burdens of mental illness at all levels
(Corrigan 2004). Yet campaigns aimed at reducing public
stigma (Table 1) remain only marginally effective, which
might be because they lack theoretical evidence and guide-
lines for developing effective designs. Social marketers have
unique expertise in this realm and can make a meaningful
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impact. With our novel perspective on public stigma, we seek
to offer substantive, theoretically informed insights on how
managers can increase the stigma reduction of their campaigns
by customizing their health messaging to match receivers’
implicit worldviews.
We also conducted a meta-analysis of the effects from our
four studies. Our results indicate significant support for each
hypothesis. The file drawer statistics, which indicate how
many null effect size values would be needed to reduce the
overall significance levels to .05 are also reported (Table 5).
These results engender greater confidence in the overall
results.
Implications for theory
This study contributes to social marketing literature in several
ways. We extend research on implicit worldviews and identify
them as important predictors of public stigma towards various
disease categories. We demonstrate that people’s implicit
worldviews of human character traits (categorical or dimen-
sional) strongly determine the level of stigma they express
(Lyndon et al. 2016). Categorical thinkers display more stig-
ma on average. This finding helps explain some variability in
public stigma, as well as why anti-stigma campaigns might
fail to achieve their desired results. That is, they fail to con-
sider and customize the content of the message to match re-
ceivers’ implicit worldviews. Nor are these insights restricted
to mental illnesses; we empirically demonstrate their rele-
vance for physical health conditions too.
In turn, we demonstrate that matching recipients’ im-
plicit worldviews with the message frame used to de-
scribe mental illness is a promising way to lower public
stigma. Previous studies recommend priming categorical
thinkers to take a dimensional worldview to reduce stig-
ma (e.g., Plaks et al. 2001; Yorkston et al. 2010). We
replicate these findings in Studies 2–4 but also extend
prior insights by integrating implicit worldviews with
two illness frames: biopsychosocial (Kiesler 1999) and
biomedical (Guze 1992). As a contribution to research
into the interaction of message frames and personality
traits, we demonstrate the benefits of matching message
frames with implicit worldviews. Specifically, we show
that categorical thinkers prefer a biomedical frame with
less ambiguity, but dimensional thinkers tend to prefer a
more nuanced, biopsychosocial frame that contains more
ambiguity. The effect of framing is reduced for dimen-
sional thinkers, which is likely a result of their more
fine-grained thinking about mental illness. As a caveat,
perceived illness severity serves as a boundary condi-
tion. The effect of matching the message frame and
worldview holds for mental illnesses and physical health
conditions perceived as less severe but not for those
perceived as more severe.
This study is also the first to demonstrate a significant reduc-
tion in stigma among categorical thinkers, simply due to the
application of a biomedical message frame. Dimensional
thinkers express higher public stigma after being exposed to a
biomedical frame, a finding that offers further support for the
prediction that violating worldviews can alter perceptions.
Implications for policymakers and managers
This study offers several insights for marketing managers and
policymakers. We shed light on why social marketing cam-
paigns aiming to reduce public stigma often yield mixed results.
If public stigma campaigns do not adopt an appropriate biomed-
ical or biopsychosocial frame, they likely fail to achieve the
desired effect (lower public stigma). Our field evidence also
implies an underuse of biomedical messages, considering the
greater levels of engagement they can produce. They align well
with categorical thinkers’ worldview, and categorical thinkers
are relevant targets for public stigma campaigns, due to their
higher level of stigma endorsement. Mismatching message
frames with worldviews can even lead to higher stigma levels,
so it is critical for social marketingmanagers to achieve a match.
We suggest increased uses of both biomedical messages and
Table 5 Meta-analysis of the proposed effects
Hypothesis Description # of
effects
Mean
effect
CI
(Lower)
CI
(Upper)
Z-
value
File
drawer
1 Categorical thinkers exhibit more public stigma, measured by social distance, than dimensional
thinkers after both groups have been exposed to counter-stigmatic information.
5 0.117** 0.061 0.169 2.852 18
2a Categorical thinkers exhibit lower levels of public stigma, measured by social distance, after
being exposed to a biomedical frame message rather than a biopsychosocial frame message.
3 0.308*** 0.165 0.438 4 29
2b Dimensional thinkers exhibit higher levels of public stigma, measured by social distance, after
being exposed to a biomedical frame message rather than a biopsychosocial frame
3 0.131** 0.033 0.226 3 3
3 When illness is perceived as low in severity, a biomedical (biopsychosocial) message frame
presented to categorical (dimensional) thinkers reduces stigma endorsement in comparison
with a biopsychosocial (biomedical) message. This effect is attenuated for illnesses perceived
as severe.
2 0.121** 0.039 0.2 3 n/a
Random effects model used. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
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social media channels to support customization. On social me-
dia, messages can be personalized to each user, and data mining
tools likely can classify users as categorical or dimensional
thinkers. Another option would be to combine appropriate
worldview primes with the applied message frame to reduce
stigma; the prime helps ensure message effectiveness.
However, such priming must be performed with care.
Managers should consider the focus of their campaigns.
Our results hold for mental and physical conditions perceived
as less severe. However, not all campaigns are as general as
the examples we used. Some specific campaigns seek to com-
bat stigma associated with particular diseases, such as depres-
sion or schizophrenia (Rochlen et al. 2005). In these cases,
managers shouldmanipulate the perceived severity of the con-
dition and leverage matching effects to lower public stigma.
Existing perceptions of illness severity among the audience
should be assessed prior to the launch of any campaign. For
diagnoses that people perceive as severe, the choice between a
biomedical and a biopsychosocial frame is less important. In
turn, we propose that campaigns might first seek to increase
understanding of the severity of the health concern before
initiating efforts to achieve public stigma reduction; that is, a
phased approach may be necessary.
Limitations and avenues for research
Our social media field data cover a 52-week period, but the
laboratory and online panel settings are cross-sectional.
Further research should replicate the reported effects with a
longitudinal field study. We demonstrate that it is possible to
reduce public stigma by matching message frames with im-
plicit worldviews in health-related conditions. Continued re-
search could test whether our findings generalize to other stig-
matization settings, such as racial and gender-related biases, in
accordance with the sustainable development goals set by the
United Nations (2018). In a similar vein, it would be interest-
ing to investigate how implicit worldviews interact with other
interpersonal differences, such as regulatory focus, that are
relevant in health decisions (Bhargave et al. 2015). Different
message frames might interact with implicit worldviews too;
for example, campaigns that emphasize greater perceived con-
trollability or treatability may alter the public stigma
expressed by categorical and dimensional thinkers. The phe-
nomenon of normalization might be considered too. Reduced
public stigma typically makes certain actions more accepted,
an outcome that should benefit people with mental illnesses
and encourage them to seek help, but it may be detrimental to
people diagnosed with obesity, in that they might reduce their
efforts to eat healthier foods or exercise more (Lin and
McFerran 2016).
Finally, our results pertain to public stigma, not the
self-stigma perceived by affected people. Researchers
could investigate whether our results extend to behavioral
intentions such as seeking and completing treatment;
many people diagnosed with mental illnesses never com-
plete or even refuse to start treatment, due to fears of
stigmatization (WHO 2010). Anecdotal evidence and
qualitative research both indicate that the success rates
of treatment programs tend to be higher if they match
patients’ worldviews (Tranulis et al. 2014). Perhaps peo-
ple who endorse an implicit worldview are more likely to
adhere to a treatment plan that adopts an appropriately
matched biomedical or biopsychosocial approach. Such
patient-centered treatment, informed by multidisciplinary
evidence, may improve mental and physical health treat-
ments and ultimately enhance the public good.
Appendix 1: Stimuli
Study 1a/Study 2, Neutral Advertisement
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Neutral Advertisement, Study 1a/ Study 2
Study 1b, Sample Biopsychosocial Sample Ad
Study 1b, Sample Biomedical Sample Ad
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Appendix 2: Scales
Implicit worldviews (Dweck et al. 1995) (α values: study
1a = .85, Study 1b = .92),
Point scale, anchors: Strongly disagree, strongly agree
1. The kind of person someone is, is something basic about
them, and it can’t be changed very much.
2. People can do things differently, but the important parts of
who they are can’t really be changed.
3. Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there’s not much
that they can do to really change that.
Social distance items (Link et al. 1999) (α values: Study
1a = .84, Study 1b = .91, Study 2 = .91, Study 3 = .92, Study
4 = .91).
Study 4, Neutral Obesity Advertisement
Study 3, Advertisements with Different Degrees of Illness Severity
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Point scale, anchors: Definitely willing, definitely
unwilling
1. Howwould you feel about renting a room in your home to
someone with a mental illness?
2. How would you feel as a worker on the same job as
someone with a mental illness?
3. How would you feel having someone with a mental ill-
ness as a neighbor?
4. How about a person with a mental illness as the caretaker
of your children for a couple of hours?
5. How about having your children marry someone with a
mental illness?
6. How would you feel about introducing a person with a
mental illness to a young woman you are friendly with?
7. How would you feel about recommending someone with
a mental illness for a job working for a friend of yours?
Familiarity with mental illnesses (Schomerus et al. 2007)
(formative scale, no α values, summed to create an index).
Which of the following situations did you experience?
(yes/no)
1. I have had a job/study which involved providing services
or treatment or persons with mental illness.
2. I have observed, in passing, a person I believe may have
had a severe mental illness.
3. I have observed persons with a severe mental illness on a
frequent basis.
4. I have worked with a person who had a severe mental
illness at my place of employment.
5. A friend of the family has a severe mental illness.
6. I have a relative who has a severe mental illness.
7. I live with a person who has a severe mental illness.
Mental illness perception 7-point scale, Semantic
Differential:
According to the above message, mental conditions are:
1. Diagnosable categories vs. Individual conditions
2. Like physical conditions vs. Different from physical
conditions
3. Medical conditions vs. An interplay of psychological, so-
cial and biological factors
4. Caused only by biological dysfunction vs. Caused by a
complex interplay of personal experiences, family dy-
namics, and biological dysfunctions
Illness severity (Witte 1996) (α value Internet
Addiction: .90; Schizophrenia: .97; Mental Illness: .96).
7 point scale, anchors strongly disagree, strongly agree
I believe that (Condition) is:
1. Severe
2. Significant
3. Serious
Appendix 3: Definitions Provided
to Respondents in Study 2, 3 and 4
Study 2 &3
Biomedical: “Because mental illness is caused by biological
dysfunctions, it can be often diagnosed as a clear-cut disease
category, just like physical illness. This also means that indi-
viduals with the same mental illness display a similar set of
symptoms even across cultures and over time.”
Biopsychosocial: “Because mental illnesses are caused by
a complex interplay of personal experiences, family dy-
namics, and biological dysfunctions, they are unique for
each individual person. This means that individuals with the
same mental illness display varying symptoms that can dif-
fer across cultures and over time.”
Study 4
Biomedical, Obesity: “Obesity is often caused by biological
dysfunctions such as genetic mutations. This means that the
causes of obesity are similar across cultures and over time
making them static and generalizable.”
Biopsychosocial, Obesity: “Obesity is often caused by a
complex interplay of psychological, social and biological
dysfunctions. This means that the causes of obesity vary
across cultures and over time making them dynamic and
individual.”
Obesity Severity Manipulation: “Obesity is relatively a
minor disease, as it is can cause arthritis, digestive problems
and diabetes.”
“Obesity is relatively a very serious disease, as it is can
cause cancer, stroke, and depression.”
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